Go Back   This Blue Marble, a Global Current Events Discussion Forum > Health and Medicine > Flu Clinic > Flu Discussion

Flu Discussion This subroom is intended for "soft discussion" of flu-related topics. This includes general chat, joke threads, scenarios, discussions of personal feelings, etc.

Reply
 
Thread Tools Search this Thread Display Modes
Old 08-01-2014, 02:52 PM   #51
gsgs
searching for truth
 
gsgs's Avatar
 
Join Date: Sep 2008
Location: Germany
Posts: 3,742
Thanks: 3
Thanked 152 Times in 107 Posts
http://journal.frontiersin.org/Journ...014.00077/full
The irrationality of GOF avian influenza virus research
Simon Wain-Hobson1,2*

from the references:
http://armscontrolcenter.org/Escaped...al_2-17-14.pdf

I didn't know the 1976 virus was temperature sensitive

when it escaped a Russian lab, then why the outbreak in China
why a 1950-strain

Kung et.al., Influenza in China in 1977
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC2395678/
__________________
a chart says more than 1000 words

Last edited by gsgs; 08-03-2014 at 05:29 AM.
gsgs is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 08-03-2014, 06:48 AM   #52
gsgs
searching for truth
 
gsgs's Avatar
 
Join Date: Sep 2008
Location: Germany
Posts: 3,742
Thanks: 3
Thanked 152 Times in 107 Posts
http://mbio.asm.org/content/5/4/e01730-14

Risks and Benefits of Gain-of-Function Experiments with Pathogens
of Pandemic Potential, Such as Influenza Virus: a Call for a
Science-Based Discussion
Arturo Casadevalla, Founding Editor-in-Chief, mBio, ,
Michael J. Imperialeb, Editor, mBio

-----------------------------------------

calling for a risk-benefit analysis is similar to asking for
panflu probability estimates.
We know, there are those who claim "can't be done",
"nobody can with any certainety ..."

But, of course it must be done, and probably will be done.
But how "good", how reliable, how well researched
the analysis is - that's another question.
__________________
a chart says more than 1000 words

Last edited by gsgs; 08-03-2014 at 08:08 AM.
gsgs is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 08-03-2014, 09:00 AM   #53
gsgs
searching for truth
 
gsgs's Avatar
 
Join Date: Sep 2008
Location: Germany
Posts: 3,742
Thanks: 3
Thanked 152 Times in 107 Posts
twiv294
smallpox,anthrax...

you can download and/or listen to the podcast:
http://www.twiv.tv/2014/07/20/twiv-294/

these people are basically pro GoF research
as opposed to the "Cambridge-group" [Cambridge,Massachusetts]


31:30 , GoF
vrr disagrees with Cambridge working group
"twice a week" - misrepresentation
not straightforward, wrong

(just the presentation or the issue itself ?)

we have NSABB [IMO not very good]
vrr's point 36:00 (no quantification)

Dickson: is for the Asilomar-type conference
Alan agrees

39:00 ... [and programmers and mathematicians to estimate the panflu-solution
density in the flu-genetic searchspace]

40:20 Vincent is happy with the existing control
40:30 Alan thinks risk-benefit-analysis isn't possible
42:00 collateral damage by Lipsich et.al

43:00 Vincent thinks the conference would not be balanced,
dominated by the Cambridge people
44:00 Vincent has an idea : scientists for science

46:00 Rich? [I cannot distinguish Rich and Dick] compares it with nuclear reactors
50:30 Alan
52:30 Vincent is ok with the conference but not these people running it
no,no national academie of science , institute of Madison

55:00 NSABB membership, rotated off who were there the longest
58:00 H5N1 --> NSABB , [forgets Taubenberger and 1918-flu]
many of the replaced people ended up in the Cambridge group

1:00:30 HIV
__________________
a chart says more than 1000 words
gsgs is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 08-08-2014, 05:21 PM   #54
gsgs
searching for truth
 
gsgs's Avatar
 
Join Date: Sep 2008
Location: Germany
Posts: 3,742
Thanks: 3
Thanked 152 Times in 107 Posts
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/25100840
pH1N1
PB1 A469T, PA 1129T, NA N329D, NS1 N205K and NEP T48N.
D187E, K211E and S289N

nine serial passages in pigs

greatly enhanced virulence and transmissibility

------------------------------

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/25100840
how to make normal flu more virulent and transmissible
(but humans are not pigs)

> there is no convincing evidence that pH1N1 was generated from a direct precursor in pigs.

well, everyone decides by what he/she is convinced. I do consider this likely (>80%)

> [after the ninth passage in pigs]
> Relative to the parental virus, the three viral clones showed enhanced replication and
> polymerase activity in vitro, and enhanced replication, pathogenicity and transmissibility in pigs,
> guinea pigs and ferrets in vivo. Specifically, two mutants of rH1N1 (PB1 A469T, and combined
> NS1 N205K and NEP T48N) were identified as determinants of transmissibility in guinea pigs.
> Crucially, one mutant viral clone with the five consensus mutations, which also carried
> D187E, K211E and S289N mutations in its hemagglutinin (HA), was additionally able to infect
> ferrets by airborne transmission as effectively the pandemic virus.
__________________
a chart says more than 1000 words

Last edited by gsgs; 08-09-2014 at 11:22 AM.
gsgs is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 08-31-2014, 11:37 PM   #55
gsgs
searching for truth
 
gsgs's Avatar
 
Join Date: Sep 2008
Location: Germany
Posts: 3,742
Thanks: 3
Thanked 152 Times in 107 Posts
CIDRAP:

Islamic extremist's laptop found to hold bioterror manual

A laptop computer captured from an Islamic extremist in Syria contains
detailed instructions on how to weaponize the bacteria that cause bubonic
plague and use them in a terrorist attack, Foreign Policy reported yesterday.

Meanwhile, Britain raised its terror alert level to "severe," the BBC noted today.

The laptop was owned by a Tunisian national who studied chemistry and physics
before joining the rebel group known as the Islamic State, or ISIS, in Syria.
It was confiscated from an ISIS hideout in January in Syria's Idlib governorate,
which borders Turkey.

The laptop contained a 19-page manual in Arabic on how to develop biological
weapons and weaponize Yersinia pestis, which causes bubonic plague, from
infected animals. "The advantage of biological weapons is that they do not
cost a lot of money, while the human casualties can be huge," the manual
states.
The computer also contained a fatwa, or Islamic ruling, permitting the use
of weapons of mass destruction on non-Muslims.
...

-----------------------------------------
those people may not realize or not care about the global danger
-----------------------------------------
is it practicable to forbid and control the DNA/RNA synthesizers ?
__________________
a chart says more than 1000 words

Last edited by gsgs; 09-01-2014 at 12:00 AM.
gsgs is offline   Reply With Quote
The Following User Says Thank You to gsgs For This Useful Post:
Ross (01-18-2015)
Old 09-01-2014, 12:07 AM   #56
CanadaSue
SuperModerator
 
CanadaSue's Avatar
 
Join Date: Nov 2008
Location: In my gardens or online
Posts: 35,508
Blog Entries: 28
Thanks: 2,486
Thanked 11,047 Times in 5,057 Posts
It would be interesting to know where that 'recipe' was obtained. CIA will know.
__________________
Searching for a dream to run after & catch!
CanadaSue is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 09-01-2014, 03:03 AM   #57
gsgs
searching for truth
 
gsgs's Avatar
 
Join Date: Sep 2008
Location: Germany
Posts: 3,742
Thanks: 3
Thanked 152 Times in 107 Posts
http://www.oxbridgebiotech.com/revie...-bioterrorism/
Given the ease of genome engineering, it is possible to introduce these five mutations
to other strains of influenza that are found only in water fowl. A potential killer flu could
be created for which there is no available vaccination or treatment. This could be a very
powerful bioweapon. Moreover, it may be possible to further engineer a modified virus for
maximum morbidity and mortality by tuning the virulence genes.
...
One current measure is the enforcement of careful sequence screening by commercial
companies before production – companies refuse to synthesise DNA sequences matching
the genome of known pathogens [8].

## but DNA/RNA synthesizers are available for purchase, you need no company

Genome editing of influenza virus still remains technically challenging for a few reasons:
Firstly, influenza is an RNA-based virus. Most of the genome editing techniques available
now are targeted at editing DNA and require a host cell with DNA repair machinery,
making the production of edited RNA more difficult.

## I don't know. But presumably special RNA "editing-techniques" will also be available soon

Secondly, simply stitching together different components of different viral genomes may
not result in a viable progeny.
Building a bio-machine is not as simple as just piecing together different DNA fragments
into one whole one – the sequence context of a gene affects its expression.

## we have lots of examples now, what will ~likely work. Foe example for reassortments
## you may get a probability of 20%-50%, so you may have to do several attempts,
## no big problem.

Thirdly, the synthetic genome may require a host cell or existing viral machinery before
it can encode a living virus, especially in the case of RNA viruses. The synthetic viral
genome may therefore be inert and thus incapable of being made into a biological weapon.

## I don't understand. You have to replicate it anyway to get larger quantities ?!
## chicken eggs, MDCK,

Lastly, if a killer virus can be easily engineered, then strains that can be used for vaccine
production can also equally be engineered, giving a line of defence.

## Firstly, it takes a while. ~ 8 months in 2009. Secondly influenza may mutate away.
## Thirdly, the influenza vaccine is often not very effective, even with a close match,
## we can't even control seasonal flu with it very well. Influenza somehow "evades" the vaccine,
## probably not just only by mutating.
## Fourthly, it may reassort with existing influenza viruses to create antigenically completely
## different strains,

------------------------------------------
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Applied_Biosystems

Mettler Toledo Myriad Personal Synthesizer
Applied Biosystems 392 DNA/RNA synthesizer
Applied Biosystems 394 DNA/RNA Synthesizer
Milligen BioSearch 8700 DNA Synthesizer
Millipore 8800 DNA Synthesizer Controller
Milligen BioSearch 8800 Reactor Module
Biotage Advantage Series 2350 Personal Screening Synthesizer
Milligen BioSearch DNA Synthesizer (Regent Delivery Module) with 8800 DNA Synthesizer Controller
Personal Chemistry Emrys Optimizer Automated Microwave Synthesizer
Biotage Initiator Sixty Robot
Argonaut Technologies Quest 210 for Parallel Synthesis
Personal Chemistry Smith Creator Microwave Assisted Organic Synthesizer
__________________
a chart says more than 1000 words

Last edited by gsgs; 09-01-2014 at 06:52 AM.
gsgs is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 09-26-2014, 10:19 AM   #58
gsgs
searching for truth
 
gsgs's Avatar
 
Join Date: Sep 2008
Location: Germany
Posts: 3,742
Thanks: 3
Thanked 152 Times in 107 Posts
says Kawaoka: Kawaoka: http://www.wisbusiness.com/index.iml?Article=330560


[but why did he publish the critical mutations ?]
__________________
a chart says more than 1000 words
gsgs is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 10-21-2014, 04:53 AM   #59
gsgs
searching for truth
 
gsgs's Avatar
 
Join Date: Sep 2008
Location: Germany
Posts: 3,742
Thanks: 3
Thanked 152 Times in 107 Posts
Steven Salzberg had an article in "Forbes" magazine

http://genome.fieldofscience.com/201...ntists-to.html
__________________
a chart says more than 1000 words
gsgs is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 10-31-2014, 08:13 AM   #60
gsgs
searching for truth
 
gsgs's Avatar
 
Join Date: Sep 2008
Location: Germany
Posts: 3,742
Thanks: 3
Thanked 152 Times in 107 Posts
did I mention this ?
http://longbets.org/9/

By 2020, bioterror or bioerror will lead to one million casualties in a single event.”
PREDICTOR Martin Rees

someone creating a pandemic flu strain, which kills >1M in 3 waves over 2 years,
would that count ?
Or just a new strain that becomes seasonal but kills in average 50% more people
than the current average from 2016 on


> Worldwide there are between 250,000 and 500,000 influenza deaths per year
__________________
a chart says more than 1000 words

Last edited by gsgs; 10-31-2014 at 08:25 AM.
gsgs is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 01-04-2015, 05:39 PM   #61
Auburn Boy
Denizen of the Gold Fields
 
Auburn Boy's Avatar
 
Join Date: Aug 2008
Posts: 8,416
Thanks: 2,298
Thanked 1,107 Times in 651 Posts
Biblioteca Influenzae..,
__________________
(\__/)
(='.'=) This is Bunny. Copy and paste bunny into your
(")_(") signature to help her gain world domination
Can't leave the Siwwy Wabbit behind!!
Auburn Boy is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 01-17-2015, 05:53 AM   #62
gsgs
searching for truth
 
gsgs's Avatar
 
Join Date: Sep 2008
Location: Germany
Posts: 3,742
Thanks: 3
Thanked 152 Times in 107 Posts
here is another great paper, that teaches the terrorists how to make
flu more virulent :
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/25505067

Mexflu should (still) be sensitive to those interferon induced Mx proteins,
as is the whole Swine-lineage since ~1900.
With another NP that might change ...

Taubenberger et.al. had sequenced H1N1 from the first wave in 1918,
but only the HAs are published. I wonder whether they have more
info but mustn't publish it ...
e.g. NP mutations at 100,283,313
__________________
a chart says more than 1000 words
gsgs is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 01-18-2015, 01:18 AM   #63
gsgs
searching for truth
 
gsgs's Avatar
 
Join Date: Sep 2008
Location: Germany
Posts: 3,742
Thanks: 3
Thanked 152 Times in 107 Posts
http://mbio.asm.org/content/5/6/e02366-14.full

http://genome.fieldofscience.com

2000 deaths per year with those high security labs -
how many could they kill if they were less carefull
or if they really wanted to ? Who gives a number ...
__________________
a chart says more than 1000 words
gsgs is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 01-27-2015, 10:21 PM   #64
gsgs
searching for truth
 
gsgs's Avatar
 
Join Date: Sep 2008
Location: Germany
Posts: 3,742
Thanks: 3
Thanked 152 Times in 107 Posts
Fouchier reply to Lipsitch+Inglesby 2000 deaths/year estimate :

http://mbio.asm.org/content/6/1/e02560-14.full.pdf
4 pages, .pdf

they finally are realizing that we must analyze and discuss the
probability estimates [using numbers] !
Rather than unclear formulations and opinions [using language]


and the reply:
http://mbio.asm.org/content/6/1/e00041-15.full.pdf
6 pages, .pdf


[I haven't read these yet]

================================================== ==

http://www.twiv.tv/2015/01/25/twiv-321/
TWiV-321,Jan.25, Audio,100min
not a discussion, since none is present of the other side
weather good
Paul's voice is hard to understand
meetings at NSABB,NatAcadSci
06:50,Vincent: all is a consequence of 2012 Fouchier,Kawaoka
09:48, Alan compares it with large hodron collider discussion in 2008, ridicules
12:30,Vincent: Wain-Hobson's increadible anger
20:00,Paul compares with measles
24:00,Dick, why stop here in USA if others continue, --> no politics
31:31,Vincent angry about Lipsitch title
33:40,Alan:history of bio-warfire = failure
he thinks that's why they shifted to the danger of accidental release
37:00,probabilities are faulty since we do not know
[gs: just estimates,debatable but not "faulty"]
40:40,Vincent: calculations must'nt be done
41:30,Alan, other optimistic assumptions as good
[gs: we must examine, go into details, discuss, improve. Same as with almost all science,
there are almost always these uncertaineties]
42:42,Vincent: Lipsitch+Inglesby response, they don't agree to some of Fouchier points --> red flag
doesn't go into the debated details
48:30,Bans do not work
48:52,Vincent: why stop, when nothing went wrong [gs: ...yet]
59:20,NSABB meeting, Paul is not a flu person
69:15,what will happen, decision in 1year, subcommities
risk-benefit analysis, aggressive timeline
72:00,poll among virology students
75:00, Lipsitch in Scientific American, his title makes Vincent
Alan:article unfortunate, Paul:title unfortunate
81:00, Vincent wants Lipsitch at TWiV
84:00, picks 89:00,Pandas
94:00,misleading press releases
96:30 German Virus Quartett [didn't work from the webpage, but there are lots
at German ebay, bought one for 10euro,disappointed,s.u.] ,
Paul in Hannover in some weeks
99:40 end



TWiV: advance is good,knowledge may give applications later
they ignore that the unknown advancements may as well be
useful for evildoers
it's much different than in other areas of science, IMO, so all these
general TWiV comparisons do not apply, you have to go into


I couldn't find a commen feature at TWiV or virology blog [removed ?], so I post here
the flu-details.


gs: we should continue experiments in a few labs just to have an advantage
about possible evildoers
but I think the TWiV-folks have no good arguments, are obviously biased
[towards science=their area,their job,their expertise vs. public health=the ignorant masses]
this can't be assessed, reasonably discussed without assigning+discussing
probabilities


mainly, I'm disappointed that the discussion is not about future biowarfire,terrorist,
dangers and (secret) lowcontrolled low-security labs researching this in future
not only HP, but how to create pandemics in general, pathogenicity seems
not so hard to change.


I'd like to post a copy of this to flutrackers and maybe a tweet
and a link at Salzberg's blog

----------------------------
32 cards, 12 bacteria,8 parasites,12 viruses
smallpox,measles,polio,rabies,hepatitisB,HIV,yello w fiever,dengue,ebola,
h5n1,h1n1,sars

they give upto 3% lethality for H1N1(2009)
USA 2009, 12000 deaths, 50M infected --> 0.02%
http://www.cdc.gov/h1n1flu/estimates_2009_h1n1.htm
--------------------------------
__________________
a chart says more than 1000 words

Last edited by gsgs; 02-03-2015 at 07:11 AM.
gsgs is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 02-27-2015, 11:48 AM   #65
gsgs
searching for truth
 
gsgs's Avatar
 
Join Date: Sep 2008
Location: Germany
Posts: 3,742
Thanks: 3
Thanked 152 Times in 107 Posts
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK274343/
Dec.2004 meeting about GOF-research

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/books/NBK274343/pdf/TOC.pdf

--------edit 2016/03/19-------------
141 pages, .pdf
lots of big names from influenza research and gof-debating !
I wished they would discuss in an internet forum like tbm, with updated threads,
addendums and replies and new developements, arguments ...
But academics prefer to do it by meetings.

the website of the foundation for vaccine research has now some news
about their planned vaccine-fund. But nothing about GoF


--------------------------------------------



the webpage of the foundation for vaccine research at www.vaccinefoundation.org
no longer exists. Remember they always announced to be operational in ~1/4 year
and then prolonged this announcement, but were never actually operational.

wayback machine has 13 captures:
http://web.archive.org/web/*/www.vaccinefoundation.org


the last one from 2014/12/18 just says:
Forbidden
You don't have permission to access / on this server.

2014/07/10 : Our webpage is in development. It will be fully
operational by summer 2014
http://web.archive.org/web/201407101...oundation.org/

I never got a reply from Peter Hale, although Richard Roberts
promised to ask him he should write something.
__________________
a chart says more than 1000 words

Last edited by gsgs; 03-19-2016 at 01:04 PM.
gsgs is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 06-02-2015, 03:18 PM   #66
gsgs
searching for truth
 
gsgs's Avatar
 
Join Date: Sep 2008
Location: Germany
Posts: 3,742
Thanks: 3
Thanked 152 Times in 107 Posts
not really GoF, but a chemical that enhances replication
study from 1994
don't tell that to the virus, or else it might get the idea to produce its own Df protease ...

http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/7930699
Common house dust mites (e.g., Dermatophagoides farinae) excrete a serine-type (Df) protease.
Dfprotease obtained from cultured mites enhanced viral replication in vitro via proteolytic cleavage
of viral hemagglutinin (HA) into HAl and HA2, which confers potent viral infectivity.
Its potency is 2- to 5-fold higher than bovine trypsin or human plasmin. Df protease
also markedly accelerated virus propagation in vivo: A minute quantity of protease
(estimated delivered amount, 0.8–3.2 µg) produced ∼4- to 100-fold increases in infectious
virus in the mouse lung. Similar augmentation of viral replication by Df protease was
observed in ferret models of nasopharyngeal infections of influenza virus. All extracts
from ordinary house dust contained a serine-type protease that cleaved HA into HAl
and HA2. Thus, mite protease in house dust may enhance the pathogenesis of influenza virus.
Received January 11, 1994.
__________________
a chart says more than 1000 words
gsgs is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 10-19-2015, 04:11 AM   #67
gsgs
searching for truth
 
gsgs's Avatar
 
Join Date: Sep 2008
Location: Germany
Posts: 3,742
Thanks: 3
Thanked 152 Times in 107 Posts
Osterholm lecture 2015/09/30
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KixdD7jwTOU

one problem with Osterholm, though : he doesn't give probability estimates
We remember him as frontrunner with his warnings about H5N1 in 2006,
which looked so much exaggerated and in conflict with the typical
implicated/perceived risk estimates in the media and from political people.

16:00 electricity took in big part in life expectancy increase in the last 100 years,
not so much modern medicine
17:30 in 1970 USSR and USA as world leaders could decide upon health issues
such as smallpox eradication and do it as leaders now we have no such leaders

21:00 never less prepared than now wrt. pandemics
pandemic bigger risk than nuclear war

remember Osterholm's "just-in-time" - concern from 2006, commonly just referred to as "JIT"
in the flu-clinic here , when it was very active under "curevents" ?
Nothing about it in this lecture.

28:00 monkeypox
1999 important for him , bioterrorism

33:00 he has no doubt that someone will make smallpox in a lab, he would never have
imagined 15-20 years ago that it might become so easy, to make smallpox viruses
just from sequences

35:00 H5N1 exploded in Egypt last year , H7N9

40:00 H5N2 spreading by wind

42:00 mosquitoes

44:00 Chicungunya

his worst paper, 2011,headache
47:00 flu-vaccine

51:30 Ebola

55:00 welcome trust = biggest organization in the world to support infectious diseases,
slightly larger than Gates

56:00 SARS , 57:30 MERS 1:01:00 virus has changed [?!] , 1:03:00 South Korea
could also happen in US
1:06:00 end ,

questions, 1:07:00 permafrost-viruses , Mars-microbes
[I'm not so much concerned about Mars-microbes. Similar
terrestrian research missions are more risky IMO]
1:09:00 funding to eradicate diseases
1:12:00 clima-change , mosquitoes, water
1:15:00 matter of organizing, his grandkids, no choice

-----------------------------------
not much about bioterrorism. nothing about JIT
and no probability estimates, no risk-assessment.
Nothing about GoF-experiments either.
So basically he's calling for more investment for infectious
diseases control, (which I feel is somehow reasonable, see
this thread) but not based on proper risk assessment
and probability estimates, but rather on presentations like
this one, whicht doesn't evaluate and weigh expected costs
and risks and benefits. I think it doesn't work this way.
__________________
a chart says more than 1000 words

Last edited by gsgs; 10-19-2015 at 07:58 AM.
gsgs is offline   Reply With Quote
The Following User Says Thank You to gsgs For This Useful Post:
blue gecko (10-19-2015)
Old 11-27-2015, 02:02 PM   #68
gsgs
searching for truth
 
gsgs's Avatar
 
Join Date: Sep 2008
Location: Germany
Posts: 3,742
Thanks: 3
Thanked 152 Times in 107 Posts
http://thebulletin.org/bioweapons-co...n-new-approach

a document submitted by the United States encouraging fellow members to develop a common understanding of “tacit knowledge,”

today's tacit is tomorrows (I mean, next decade's) widely available

(tacit=stillschweigend = silent,secret)
__________________
a chart says more than 1000 words
gsgs is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 12-03-2015, 03:46 AM   #69
Dude111
An Awesome Dude
 
Join Date: Feb 2013
Posts: 663
Thanks: 455
Thanked 137 Times in 82 Posts
Exclamation

Quote:
Originally Posted by Sysiphus
I am betting on the former given our seemingly limitless ability as a species to fuck up.
Yes constantly!!

THIS STUFF CAN EASILY BE SPREAD THRU VACCINES!!!!!!

I for one try to stay clear of these things and just about EVERY YEAR about the time sheeple start rolling up thier sleeves,I COME DOWN WITH SOMETHING!! (Almost every year)

DOES THAT TELL YOU SOMETHING???? People who get this crap injected into them ARE ULTIMATELY SPREADING IT AND PUTTING US ALL @ RISK!!!!!!!


I just got over something.... Fever,throwing up (Although all 6 times nothing came up),etc........ I still have diareea though.......
Dude111 is offline   Reply With Quote
Old 12-14-2016, 11:01 AM   #70
gsgs
searching for truth
 
gsgs's Avatar
 
Join Date: Sep 2008
Location: Germany
Posts: 3,742
Thanks: 3
Thanked 152 Times in 107 Posts
Global Health Security Agenda (GHSA). GHSA is a collaborative
effort by more than 50 countries working to ensure that every
country has the minimum infrastructure necessary to prevent,
detect, and respond to disease outbreaks.



https://www.ghsagenda.org/packages/p...ty-biosecurity


Five-Year Target: A whole-of-government national biosafety and biosecurity1system i
s in place, ensuring that especially dangerous pathogens2 are identified, held,
secured and monitored in a minimal number of facilities according to best practices;
biological risk management training and educational outreach are conducted to
promote a shared culture of responsibility, reduce dual use risks, mitigate biological
proliferation and deliberate use threats, and ensure safe transfer of biological agents;
and country-specific biosafety and biosecurity legislation, laboratory licensing, and
pathogen control measures are in place as appropriate.

As Measured by: Number of countries who have completed/Completion of a national
framework and comprehensive oversight system for pathogen biosafety and biosecurity,
strain collections, containment laboratories and monitoring systems that includes
identification and storage of national strain collections in a minimal number of facilities.

Desired National Impact: Implementation of a comprehensive, sustainable and legally
embedded national oversight program for biosafety and biosecurity, including the safe
and secure use, storage, disposal, and containment of pathogens found in laboratories
and a minimal number of holdings across the country, including research, diagnostic
and biotechnology facilities. A cadre of biological risk management experts possesses
the skillset to train others within their respective institutions. Strengthened, sustainable
biological risk management best practices are in place using common educational
materials. Rapid and culture-free diagnostics are promoted as a facet of biological
risk management. The transport of infectious substances will also be taken into account.

Country Commitments to Action Package:

Leading countries: Canada, Denmark, Kenya, Peru, Portugal, Spain
Contributing countries: Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, Cote d'Ivoire, Finland, Germany,
Ghana, Jordan, Republic of Korea, Saudi Arabia, Singapore, United Kingdom, United States
Contributing international organizations: FAO, IAEA, INTERPOL, OIE, WHO

Supporting Resources:

Biosafety/Biosecurity Action Package Resource Catalogue [PDF, 137KB]
__________________
a chart says more than 1000 words
gsgs is offline   Reply With Quote
The Following 3 Users Say Thank You to gsgs For This Useful Post:
blue gecko (12-15-2016), CanadaSue (12-14-2016), Catbird (12-14-2016)
Reply

Tags
made, man, pandemic

Thread Tools Search this Thread
Search this Thread:

Advanced Search
Display Modes

Posting Rules
You may not post new threads
You may not post replies
You may not post attachments
You may not edit your posts

BB code is On
Smilies are On
[IMG] code is On
HTML code is Off

Forum Jump


All times are GMT -4. The time now is 04:49 PM.


Powered by vBulletin®
Copyright © Jelsoft Enterprises Ltd.